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ABSTRACT 
Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives 
by Roman Inderst and Christian Wey 
This paper investigates how the formation of larger buyers affects a supplier's 
profits and, by doing so, his incentives to undertake non-contractible activities. 
We first identify two chan-nels of buyer power, which allows larger buyers to 
obtain discounts. We subsequently exam-ine the effects of buyer power on the 
supplier's incentives and on social welfare. Contrary to some informal claims in 
the policy debate on buyer power, we find that the exercise of buyer power -
even though reducing supplier's profits- may often increase a supplier's 
incentive to undertake welfare enhancing activities. 
 
Keywords:  Buyer Power, Investments, Competition Policy 
JEL Classification:  D43, L13, L40 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Käufermacht und die Investitionsanreize der Hersteller 
Dieser Aufsatz entwickelt einen Modellrahmen zur Analyse der Wirkungen von 
Käufermacht auf Zwischenproduktmärkten. Zunächst werden Bedingungen 
identifiziert, die gewährleisten, daß Käufer mit großem Nachfragevolumen von 
Herstellern günstigere Konditionen erhalten als relativ kleine Käufer und somit 
über „Käufermacht“ verfügen. So dann untersucht die Arbeit, ob die Existenz 
von Käufermacht zu einer Verringerung der Innovationsanreize auf Seiten der 
Herstellern führt. Es wird gezeigt, daß eine solche Vermutung im Allgemeinen 
unzutreffend ist und daß Käufermacht im Gegenteil häufig höhere 
Investitionsanstrengungen auf der Herstellerseite induziert. 
1 Introduction
In many industries suppliers face increasingly concentrated demand and overall more
powerful buyers. A prominent example is the growing power of retailers, in particular
in the fast-moving consumer goods industry. According to studies commissioned by
the European Commission (EC 1999) and the OECD (OECD 1999) the grocery retail
market in several member states of the European Union is dominated by a small number
of large retailers. Although market concentration is less extreme in the US, concerns
have been expressed more recently about the increasing number of retail mergers (see,
e.g., Balto 1999) and the growing power of retailers over their suppliers (see, e.g., FTC
2001).1
Retailing is, however, not the only industry where buyer power is on the rise. Ca-
sual evidence suggests that suppliers’ bargaining power has eroded in numerous other
manufacturing industries such as automobiles and also in service industries such as
healthcare.2 Besides merging and forming a single entity, an alternative way for buyers
to increase their clout is to form purchasing alliances. This is a very common step in
retailing (see, e.g., Robinson and Clarke-Hill 1995). To obtain discounts such alliances
may also be only of a very temporary nature, e.g., in order to bundle purchases at
internet platforms.3
Should the formation of larger and stronger buyers be of concern to antitrust au-
thorities? According to the textbook model (e.g., Blair and Harrison 1993 or Scherer
and Ross 1990, Chapter 14) a higher concentration among buyers leads to a strategic
reduction in purchases with the aim of reducing prices.4 This argument rests on a mirror
image of the exercise of market power by sellers. A single price prevails at which all mar-
ket transactions take place. Buyers (sellers) aﬀect this price by strategically withholding
demand (supply).5 While this picture may be adequate for most final goods markets
and also for some input markets in which standard commodities are traded, it seems to
be less suitable to describe the interaction between buyers and suppliers in our previous
1Although concentration in the US grocery retail market is low at a national level, there have been
considerable increases at the regional level (see, e.g., Cotterill 1997).
2For instance, Gaynor and Haas-Wilson (1999) suggest that mergers in the US healthcare industry in
the 1990s were motivated by hospitals’ and other payers’ attempts to improve their bargaining position.
3For a discussion of the potential implications of B2B platforms see FTC (2000).
4This view is also taken explicitly in US antitrust regulation. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines
(1992, revised 1997; Paragraph 0.1) provide that “(m)arket power...encompasses the ability of a single
buyer (a “monopsonist”), a coordinating group of buyers, or a single buyer, not a monopsonist, to
depress the price paid for a product to a level that is below the competitive price and thereby depress
output.”
5See Hendricks and McAfee (2000) for a model that incorporates strategic behavior of both sellers
and buyers.
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examples, where prices are often set in bilateral negotiations or in auctions organized
separately by individual buyers. While the exercise of buyer power should lead to more
favorable deals obtained by larger and stronger buyers, it should not result in an overall
reduction of purchases.6
If the formation of larger buyers does not negatively aﬀect the performance of the
input market, it could still reduce competition on the final goods market. However,
in many instances anti-competitive eﬀects on the final goods market are also not likely
to occur. Members of buyer groups, while pooling their orders to obtain better deals
from suppliers, may continue to compete fiercely for consumers. Anti-competitive eﬀects
are also absent in mergers between retailing chains that operate in diﬀerent geographic
markets.7 Furthermore, the growing use of divestitures in merger control may leave
competition in regional retailing markets unchanged after a merger of two retailing
chains (see Balto 1999).
If traditional concerns about the monopolization of upstream or downstreammarkets
are not an issue, are there still reasons why regulators should care about the exercise
of buyer power?8 In this paper we focus on the often expressed view that buyer power
negatively aﬀects upstream incentives to invest in product and process innovation. In
particular, this view has been repeatedly expressed regarding the grocery retail indus-
try.9 According to a report for the European Commission, buyer power may force
manufacturers “to reduce investment in new products or product improvements, adver-
tising and brand building” (EC 1999, p. 4), while according to a report for the FTC
consumers “could be adversely aﬀected by the exercise of buyer power in the longer run,
if prices to suppliers are reduced below a competitive level and if the suppliers respond
by under-investing in innovation or production” (FTC 2000, p. 57 and Footnote 190).
The aim of this paper is twofold. We first show how buyer power can arise under
negotiated supply contracts. We then apply our model to investigate the argument that
buyer power reduces suppliers’ incentives. We find that suppliers’ total profits, which
may well erode following the formation of larger buyers, provide a misleading picture.
What is more important is the way in which the “composition” of suppliers’ profits is
6Our view is certainly not original. For instance, in OECD (1981) the definition of buyer power
rests on the ability of strong buyers to obtain more favorable terms, while in FTC (2001, p. 56) it is
explicitly recognized that the exercise of buyer power should not reduce volume.
7Similarly, in the automobile industry the cars of two merging companies may only appeal to the
residents of diﬀerent countries.
8In his well-known critique of Galbraith’s (1952) optimistic assessment of countervailing power,
Stigler (1954) already held the opinion that it will only redistribute monopoly rents while leaving
consumer surplus unaﬀected.
9The US health service is another industry where the impact of buyer power on quality and invest-
ment has been addressed (see, e.g., Pitofsky 1997).
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aﬀected by the presence of larger buyers.
Precisely, we consider a model where a single supplier serves a number of downstream
firms. Input prices and quantities are determined in bilateral negotiations, though we
show that our framework also encompasses the case where buyers compete in an auc-
tion. To focus on the exercise of buyer power on the input market, we abstract from
interactions on the final goods market. For instance, firms may use the supplier’s input
to produce final goods with independent demands or, in case of retailers, outlets may
be located in diﬀerent regions. Under reasonable assumptions larger buyers manage to
negotiate lower prices. We isolate two sources of buyer power.
First, a larger buyer may be able to use a stronger threat of withdrawing his de-
mand. For an intuitive argument suppose that the supplier has fixed capacity. When
negotiations with a small buyer fail, the supplier can easily sell the released capacity to
other firms without suﬀering a large reduction in the prevailing price. In contrast, if
negotiations with a large buyer fail, selling the quantity that was previously earmarked
for this buyer to other firms should have a larger impact on prices and revenues. As
documented below, a similar line of argument has been used in recent antitrust cases.
Second, buyer power can originate from characteristics of the supplier’s production
technology. We show that larger buyers can obtain a discount if production costs are
convex, implying globally increasing unit costs. Intuitively, while a (very) small buyer
has to negotiate over additional production “at the margin”, where incremental costs are
high, a larger buyer’s supply spans a wider production interval, implying overall lower
unit costs.
We next consider a supplier’s incentives to choose between diﬀerent non-contractible
strategies of production or process innovation. As each buyer obtains a share of his
respective net contribution to total industry profits, the supplier aims at the same time
to increase total industry profits and to reduce the contribution of each individual buyer.
How the supplier solves this problem depends on the downstream market structure.
Facing larger buyers the supplier is able to roll over more of his incremental production
costs at large quantities and less of his incremental production costs at small quantities.
This consideration aﬀects his incentives for process innovation. Moreover, facing larger
buyers the supplier’s profits depend much on how well he can respond to a large shortfall
in his demand. This consideration aﬀects his incentives for product choice and product
improvement. In both instances of process and product innovation we argue that the
formation of larger buyers should induce the supplier to choose strategies that increase
total output and, by rasing consumer surplus, possibly increase social welfare.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the related
literature. Section 3 presents the model. In Section 4 we derive equilibrium profits. We
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analyze the impact of buyer size on profits in Section 5, while in Section 6 we study
how the emergence of larger buyers aﬀects the supplier’s incentives and thereby social
welfare. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
There is a small literature analyzing the sources and implications of buyer power in
an industrial organization setting; i.e., the ability of larger buyers to obtain better
terms. The role of increasing unit costs as a source of buyer power has also been
recognized in Chipty and Snyder (1999) and Inderst and Wey (2001). These papers
apply a cooperative solution concept and they only show that two firms are better oﬀ
by merging. In particular, they do not derive general conditions that ensure that larger
buyers are better oﬀ than smaller buyers.10 In Katz (1987) a larger buyer can exert
more pressure on a supplier as he can more credibly threaten to integrate backwards.11
According to another line of argument, which is expressed in Scherer and Ross (1990,
Chapter 14) and formalized in Snyder (1996), a larger buyer’s purchasing order is more
likely to succeed in breaking up potential collusion between suppliers.12
Another strand of the literature analyses the exercise of “countervailing” power by
a more concentrated downstream market (von Ungern-Sternberg 1996 and Dobson and
Waterson 1997, which build on Horn and Wolinsky 1988a). Buyers are always symmetric
in these models, which does not allow to study whether larger buyers can obtain more
favorable terms.13 Finally, Marx and Shaﬀer (2001) model buyer power as a switch
from a regime where suppliers propose contracts to a regime where this is done by
10In fact, it can be shown that for the chosen solution concept (the Shapley value) increasing unit
costs are not generally suﬃcient to make a larger buyer better oﬀ. In Inderst and Wey (2001) the
Shapley value is obtained from a non-cooperative procedure by making contracts contingent on the
set of successful negotiations. Inderst and Wey (2001) focus on the equilibrium up- and downstream
market structure in a bilateral duopoly, but they also study the impact of market structure on the
choice between two linear production technologies.
11This approach has also been adopted in Scheﬀman and Spiller (1992) and Innes and Sexton (1993).
12In a similar vein it is argued informally by Stigler (1964) and Porter (1976) that a secret price cut
by a supplier is more likely to become known in a market with many buyers. The threat of retaliation
by other suppliers may thus make a (deviating) price cut less likely if there are many small buyers.
The ability of large buyers to defeat supplier cartels is questioned in Kolasky (2000), who reports many
cases where successful cartels sell to large buyers.
13More precisely, buyer power is studied in Dobson and Waterson (1997) under Bertrand competition
with diﬀerentiated products and in von Ungern-Sternberg (1996) under Cournot competition with
homogenous products. In the former model, firms are always symmetric as a merger between two
buyers involves the abandonment of one party’s brand, while in the latter model perfect substitutability
of products ensures that buyers remain symmetric after mergers.
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buyers, which typically also solves or creates additional problems of coordination failure
in contracting.14
There is a small empirical literature linking market concentration to buyer and sup-
plier profitability (see the summary in Ellison and Snyder 2001). As these papers, with
the exception of case studies, confine themselves to the regression of up- and down-
stream concentration measures on measures of profitability, they do not have much to
say on whether larger buyers enjoy discounts. More recent studies of the US healthcare
industry investigate whether certain buyers, e.g., certain hospitals or certain insurers,
enjoy discounts compared to other buyers. These studies focus less on buyers’ size and
more on how easily they can substitute between diﬀerent suppliers, e.g., to which degree
insurers can restrict their patients’ choice (see, for instance, Ellison and Snyder 2001
and Sorensen 2001).
By studying a supplier’s incentives to undertake non-contractible activities of pro-
cess or product innovation, our paper is related to the vast literature on the hold-up
problem (Grout 1984). The main paradigm, following the formalization in Grossman
and Hart (1986), studies the role of integrating the investing parties. In contrast, we
study -amongst other things- how the integration of some buyers aﬀects the incentives
of the upstream supplier. There is also a small strand of the hold-up literature that an-
alyzes the impact of competition (see Felli and Roberts 2001 for an overview). In these
models agents typically match pairwise, while competition is defined as the degree of
substitutability of diﬀerent agents on either side of the market. A change in competition
has thus quite diﬀerent implications than the formation of a larger buyer has in our set-
ting with multilateral supply contracts. Other papers investigate the impact of vertical
integration on the incentives of excluded downstream firms (Bolton and Whinston 1993)
or of excluded upstream firms (McLaren 2000 and Choi and Yi 2000), though they all
address issues that are not overlapping with those in our paper. Spulber (2002) studies
how incentives to invest depend on the market microstructure, i.e., on whether buyers
and sellers match in a decentralized market or in a dealer market. Finally, Kranton and
Minehart (2000) analyze incentives to invest into the formation of exchange networks
and the relative benefits of vertical integration before prices are determined.
14Whether the integration of agents allows them to extract more rents in negotiations has also been
studied in other economic environments; see, e.g., Stole and Zwiebel (1996) and Horn and Wolinsky
(1988b) for union-firm bargaining. Segal (2001) provides an overview and studies the benefits from
integration under various cooperative solution concepts.
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3 The Model
We consider a single supplier producing the quantity x of some input. His production
technology is described by the cost function C(x). We allow both for the case where x
is unconstrained and for the case where the supplier’s capacity has an upper boundary
denoted by X. Inputs are used by N ≥ 2 downstream firms. For simplicity, we assume
that the downstream firms’ technology converts each unit of the supplier’s input into
a unit of the final good at a zero marginal cost. Firms serve independent markets
characterized by the same inverse demand function p(x). The restriction to independent
markets for final goods allows us to focus on the input market. The specification of the
simple production technology for intermediary firms and the symmetry assumption are
made to facilitate the exposition of our results, which can be generalized. We denote
revenues generated at each firm by R(x) := xp(x). Finally, we assume that the cost
function is twice continuously diﬀerentiable over x < X and that the same holds for the
inverse demand function over all x satisfying p(x) > 0.
Some downstream firms may belong to the same owner. Given symmetry of firms,
the market for inputs is thus described by specifying the number ri of firms controlled
by any buyer (or owner) i = 1, ..., I. Note that
PI
i=1 ri = N .
We next specify how input prices and quantities are determined. Each buyer nego-
tiates separately with the supplier. A contract with buyer i, who purchases inputs for
ri firms, specifies a menu of prices ti(xi) as a function of the supplied quantity xi.15 As
there is no uncertainty, in equilibrium each buyer will receive a deterministic quantity.
We denote this choice by x¯i and the respective transfer by t¯i = ti(x¯i). The supplier’s
sales representatives negotiate with each buyer simultaneously and independently over
the respective menu ti. The quantity x¯i is chosen to maximize the joint surplus of the two
sides. The equilibrium transfer t¯i is determined such that a buyer receives the fraction
ρ ∈ (0, 1] of the generated net surplus. As argued in more detail below, setting ρ = 1 will
obtain the same outcome as that arising from a menu auction between buyers. When
determining x¯i and t¯i the two sides form rational expectations about the outcomes of all
other negotiations.
As there is no uncertainty, the buyers’ and the supplier’s representatives are indif-
ferent regarding the choice of ti(x) for all quantities x 6= x¯i. To pin down the menu we
make the following specification. We specify that it is the supplier who has the right to
pick a quantity on the menu, while the menu ti truthfully reflects the valuation of buyer
i. To formalize the second specification, note first that by optimality the buyer will
15An example would be a percentage quantity discount, where the size of the discount is a function
of the percentage of its total sales the supplier sells to a retailer.
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allocate a supplied quantity x symmetrically over all controlled markets if the demand
function is falling, which is assumed to hold. Hence, to truthfully reflect the buyer’s
valuation, ti must satisfy for all quantities x0 and x00 the requirement16
ti(x
00)− ti(x0) = ri [R(x00/ri)−R(x0/ri)] . (1)
As there is a single supplier, the requirement of truthfulness for each buyer is natural. It
leaves the supplier with all rents generated by adjusting individual supplies, which could
become profitable if there was no agreement with a subset of buyers. One implication of
truthfulness will be that supplies are chosen to maximize total industry profits both on
and oﬀ equilibrium, which excludes the possibility of mutually beneficial renegotiations.17
The considered contracts are suﬃciently complex to disentangle the issue of surplus
maximization (achieved by choosing x¯i) from that of surplus sharing (achieved by choos-
ing t¯i). There is ample evidence in retailing that contracts, in particular with branded
suppliers, are relatively complex, specifying, for instance, promotional allowances, vol-
ume discounts, up-front or pay-to-stay fees, or the provision of additional services by
the supplier.18 As will become clear in what follows, the intuition behind our results
does, however, not hinge on the chosen contractual form, i.e., that contracts prescribe
truthful menus. We thus conjecture that our insights extend as well to the opposite
extreme where contracts are constrained to be extremely simple and specify for each
buyer only a single input price, i.e., a linear tariﬀ.19 It is, however, crucial that buyers
negotiate separately with the supplier and can therefore obtain diﬀerent deals. This is
clearly a prerequisite for the exercise of buyer power as defined in the introduction, i.e.,
as the ability of larger (or otherwise stronger) buyers to obtain more favorable terms.
In this regard it is important to note for applications to the U.S. that, while the result-
ing discounts may oﬀend the spirit of the Robinson-Patman Act in the U.S., antitrust
authorities and courts have become less eager to enforce it in a narrow sense.20
16For the truthfulness requirement in first-price menu auctions, see Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
17Once the issue of possible co-ordination failure to achieve the optimal supplies is ruled out, equilib-
rium supplies do not depend on the truthfulness requirement. This is clearly diﬀerent to models with
downstream interaction of buyers (see, e.g., Kühn 1997).
18As ti(0) < 0 will typically hold, the respective payment can be interpreted as a slotting allowance.
While the use of slotting allowances has certainly increased, at least for branded goods, there is no
consensus on how widespread and important they are (see, e.g., Sullivan 1997 and FTC 2001).
19The question of choosing between a linear-tariﬀ (or “arms-length” or “double-marginalization”)
model or an eﬃcient-contracting (or “two-part tariﬀ” or “joint-profit maximization”) model has a
long history. We found that already Morgan (1949) contains a detailed discussion. Scherer and Ross
(1990) report that the eﬃcient contracting model goes back to Bowley (1928), though only applied
to a bilateral monopoly. With linear tariﬀs a shift of rents to downstream firms also reduces the
double-marginalization problem by lowering input prices.
20An illustrative case, which is discussed in Scherer and Ross (1990), is that of the retailer A&P in
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4 Profits under Various Market Structures
To state our results in a convenient way, we need some additional notation. Suppose
the supplier serves only n of the N downstream firms. Suppose also that, given this
restriction, supplies are chosen so as to maximize total industry profits. We assume
that the total quantity that maximizes industry surplus is uniquely determined and
strictly positive. We denote total quantity supplied to the n active downstream firms
by x∗n. We denote the respective revenues realized at each of the n active firms by
R∗n := (x
∗
n/n)p(x
∗
n/n). Total realized industry profits are denoted by Π∗n := nR∗n−C(x∗n).
As demand at each firm is strictly falling, we obtain that Π∗n is strictly increasing in n.
We specify C(0) = 0, from which it follows that Π∗0 = 0.
We next state an immediate implication of the truthfulness requirement. When
making his choice on how to supply to the diﬀerent buyers, the supplier fully internalizes
both the incremental revenues and the incremental costs. As a consequence, he produces
the total quantity x∗N and supplies x¯i = x
∗
Nri/N to buyer i. Note, in particular, that
this holds irrespective of the prevailing transfers t¯i, which pin down the distribution of
rents. Likewise, if -out of equilibrium- there is failure to agree with some buyers such
that negotiations are only successful with a subset I 0 ⊆ I of buyers, the total quantity
x∗n is produced, where n =
P
i∈I0 ri, and each buyer i ∈ I 0 is supplied with the quantity
x∗nri/n.
Lemma 1. If there is agreement with a (sub)set of buyers I 0 ⊆ I, the total quantity
x∗n is produced, where n =
P
i∈I0 ri. Moreover, buyer i ∈ I 0 receives the quantity x∗nri/n.
Fragmented downstream industry
Suppose first that each buyer owns a single firm. Consider negotiations between
buyer i and the supplier. As all bilateral negotiations are successful, we obtain from
Lemma 1 the quantities x¯i = x∗N/N . Using t¯i = ti(x¯i), the aggregate payoﬀ of the
supplier, which we denote by V , becomes V :=
P
i∈I t¯i − C (x∗N). To determine the
equilibrium transfer t¯i, we must derive the two parties’ outside options if negotiations
fail. Clearly, the buyer will receive zero utility. If bargaining with buyer i breaks down,
the supplier obtains his outside option payoﬀ
V 0i :=
X
j∈I\{i}
tj(x
∗
N−1/(N − 1))− C
³
x∗N−1
´
, (2)
where the supply level is optimally adjusted. By the truthfullness condition (1) the
supplier can capture the entire incremental revenues from re-adjusting the supplies to
1979. A&P threatened to withdraw its demand from the milk producer Borden unless it obtained a
suﬃciently large discount. Even though the discount gave A&P a substantial cost advantage compared
to other buyers, it was not objected in the final court decision.
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all other buyers j 6= i. Using this, we obtain the requirement
X
j∈I\{i}
tj(x
∗
N−1/(N − 1)) =
X
j∈I\{i}
t¯j + (N − 1)
h
R
³
x∗N−1/(N − 1)
´
−R (x∗N/N)
i
. (3)
Substituting (3) into (2), the expression for the supplier’s outside option becomes
V 0i =
X
j∈I\{i}
t¯j +Π∗N−1 − (N − 1)R(x∗N/N). (4)
As the supplier receives the fraction 1−ρ of the realized net surplus and as the supplier’s
total profits equal
P
j∈I t¯j − C (x∗N), we obtain the requirement
X
j∈I
t¯j − C (x∗N) = V 0i + (1− ρ)

R(x∗N/N) +
X
j 6=i
t¯j − C(x∗N)− V 0i

 . (5)
By (4) and (5) all menus ti are identical. Solving (5) for the supplier’s profits, we obtain
V = Π∗N −Nρ(Π∗N −Π∗N−1). (6)
Expression (6) has a simple intuition. With each individual buyer the supplier essentially
bargains over how to share the additional surplus generated by serving N instead of
N − 1 firms. The additional surplus is given by the diﬀerence in maximum industry
profits Π∗N − Π∗N−1. As each buyer extracts the fraction ρ of this diﬀerence, we obtain
expression (6).
The derivation of the supplier’s profits in (6) comes with one caveat. It is assumed
that (6) is non-negative. This is surely the case if industry profits Π∗n are concave in n.
Below we derive conditions when this holds and we will later focus our analysis on this
case.
One buyer controlling two firms
Suppose now a single buyer, say i = 1, controls two firms, which reduces the number
of independent buyers from N to N −1. If negotiations with the integrated buyer break
down, we know from Lemma 1 that the supplier chooses the aggregate quantity x∗N−2.
This reduces his costs by C(x∗N)−C(x∗N−2) and generates the additional revenues (N −
2)
h
R(x∗N−2/(N − 2))−R(x∗N/N)
i
, which the supplier fully capture by the truthfulness
requirement. Hence, the supplier’s outside option when negotiating with the larger buyer
becomes
V 01 =
X
j 6=1
t¯j +Π∗N−2 − (N − 2)R(x∗N/N). (7)
When negotiating with any of the small buyers i > 1 his outside option is still given
by (4). Equilibrium profits are again obtained by substituting outside options into the
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requirement that the supplier obtains the fraction 1 − ρ of the respective net surplus.
Putting results together, we now obtain for the supplier’s profits
V = Π∗N − ρ
h
(N − 1)Π∗N − (N − 2)Π∗N−1 −Π∗N−2
i
. (8)
This expression is again intuitive. The large buyer can extract the fraction ρ of the
diﬀerence Π∗N −Π∗N−2, while each small buyer can extract the fraction ρ of the diﬀerence
Π∗N −Π∗N−1.
Generalization
It is straightforward to extend the derivation of profits to any downstream market
structure. We obtain the following general result.
Proposition 1. A buyer controlling ri firms obtains the profits ρ
h
Π∗N −Π∗N−ri
i
,
while the supplier obtains the profits Π∗N − ρ
PI
i=1
h
Π∗N −Π∗N−ri
i
.
We conclude this section with some remarks on Proposition 1. As noted previously,
the case with ρ = 1 is equivalent to an auction where buyers submit truthful menus.
In this case buyers extract their full net surplus.21 Note also that we specified that a
buyer’s outside option has zero value, implying, in particular, that the buyer has no
access to an alternative supplier. It is now straightforward to allow for the presence of
an alternative source of supply for each buyer. If procuring from an inferior (fringe)
supplier allows to realize the profits U ≥ 0 at an individual firm, buyer i obtains the
profits ρ[Π∗N −Π∗N−ri ] + Uri(1− ρ).
5 The Exercise of Buyer Power
5.1 Discounts to Larger Buyers
In the previous section we first derived the supplier’s profits under the two market
structures where the downstream market was either fully fragmented or where there was
a single larger buyer controlling two firms. Comparing the supplier’s profits for the two
cases, we obtain that he is worse oﬀ after the integration of two firms if it holds that
21This observation is reassuring for the following reason. Our negotiation procedure prescribes that
the parties share the generated net surplus, which is calculated by subtracting the values of the two
parties’ outside options. As argued in detail in Binmore et al. (1986), the threat to take up the
outside option may not be credible if the respective side could receive already more than this when
negotiating whilst ignoring its outside option. However, as demonstrated by the same authors, we are
back to the standard model where outside options always matter if negotiations proceed under the risk
of breakdown. A menu-auction between buyers and sellers is also considered in O’Brien and Shaﬀer
(1997), albeit applied to a setting with two upstream and one downstream firm.
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Π∗N−Π∗N−1 < Π∗N−1−Π∗N−2, i.e., if the function of industry profits Π∗n exhibits decreasing
increments from N − 2 to N . The loss incurred by the supplier equals the gain of the
two firms that merged to form a larger buyer.
Using Proposition 1 we can ask more generally when a larger buyer can obtain a
more favorable deal. For this purpose denote by τ i the average (or unit) price paid by
buyer i. From Proposition 1 we obtain that the buyer’s realized margin is given by
p(x∗N/N)− τ i =
ρ
h
Π∗N −Π∗N−ri
i
ri
N
x∗N
. (9)
Larger buyers thus enjoy a discount whenever the term
h
Π∗N −Π∗N−r
i
/r is strictly in-
creasing in the number of controlled firms r. In this case a merger between buyers of
arbitrary size is strictly beneficial for the involved buyers and reduces the supplier’s
profits. Note, however, that a merger does not aﬀect the profits of other buyers.
An alternative way to form a larger buyer is the case where a smaller buyer sells
assets (i.e., firms) to a larger buyer. Suppose that r firms are sold by buyer i = 1 to
buyer i = 2, where r2 > r1 > r. Using Proposition 1, the supplier’s payoﬀ then changes
by the diﬀerence
ρ
h
Π∗N−r1+r −Π
∗
N−r1
i
− ρ
h
Π∗N−r2 −Π
∗
N−r2−r
i
. (10)
For (10) to be strictly negative irrespective of the choices of r1, r2, and r, it is no longer
suﬃcient that
h
Π∗N −Π∗N−r
i
/r is strictly increasing in r. We now need the stronger
condition that industry profits Π∗n are strictly concave in n, i.e., that for all n ≥ 2 it
holds that
Π∗n −Π∗n−1 < Π∗n−1 −Π∗n−2. (11)
Before exploring in the next section when this condition is satisfied, we first summarize
the just obtained implications of Proposition 1 in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Suppose (11) holds, i.e., industry profits are strictly concave in n.
Then the creation of a larger buyer, e.g., through a merger or a sale of assets, reduces
the supplier’s profits, while a larger buyer obtains more favorable terms.
5.2 Two Sources of Buyer Power
We explore next under which conditions (11) holds. We find that buyer power may
originate both from characteristics of the final demand and from characteristics of the
supplier’s production technology.
Buyer power originating from the characteristics of final demand
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To isolate buyer power originating from the characteristics of final demand, suppose
that the supplier has a fixed capacity X and that production costs are zero until the
capacity constraint is reached. Moreover, let the capacity be suﬃciently small such that
it constrains the maximization of industry surplus even if only a single firm is supplied.
Industry profits are then given by Π∗n = nR(X/n) for all n.
Take first the case where the downstream market is fully fragmented. If negotiations
with one buyer fail, the supply at each of the remaining N−1 firms increases from X/N
to X/(N−1), which depresses the prevailing price. The resulting loss in revenues equals
NR(X/N)− (N − 1)R(X/(N − 1)).
The larger this loss, the lower becomes the value of the supplier’s outside option when
negotiating with a single buyer. Consider next the case where a single large buyer
controls r firms. If negotiations with the large buyer break down, the supplier will
shift the released capacity rX/N to the remaining N − r firms, which reduces the
prevailing price from p(X/N) to p(X/(N − r)). The resulting loss in revenues, which
again determines the supplier’s outside option, is now given by
NR(X/N)− (N − r)R(X/(N − r)). (12)
Clearly, the large buyer can obtain more profits than r independent buyers if total
revenues lost by a break-down in negotiations, i.e., (12), increase over-proportionally
with the buyer’s size. As is easily checked and formalized in Proposition 2, a suﬃcient
condition is that revenues R(x) are strictly concave, implying -as capacity is fixed- that
also industry profits Π∗n are strictly concave in n.
Interestingly, the fact that larger buyers can inflict on suppliers a damage that grows
over-proportionally with their size seems to be regarded by antitrust authorities as a
major source of buyer power. One case where this was made explicit is the acquisition
of Prudential’s health insurance assets by Aetna in the US.22 As described in detail in
Schwartz (1999, p.8), it was feared that “a physician’s total costs of replacing patients
unexpectedly can increase by more-than-proportionally with the number of patients that
must be replaced. ... (T)he physician’s increased prospective loss per patient if dropped
by Aetna increases Aetna’s ability to force the physician to accept a lower price post
merger.”
A related argument underlies some recent decisions by the European Commission.
In its decisions on the mergers of the retailers Kesko and Tuko and of the retailers
Carrefour and Promodes the Commission expressed the view that for some suppliers
22United States, et al. v. Aetna, Inc, et al., No. 3-99CV1398-H (N.D. Tex.) (complaint filed June
21, 1999).
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the merged firm would control a fraction of their total sales exceeding some “critical”
threshold.23 According to the Commission a supplier’s economic viability is endangered
if he is shut out from supplying to a firm whose share in his total sales exceeds this
threshold. Consequently, if a merger allows a buyer to surpass this threshold, he can
exert enormous pressure on the respective suppliers. This argument, if it is taken literally,
relies much on the ideas that suppliers cannot swiftly scale down production to save costs
or find alternative outlets for their production, while at the same time they cannot bridge
a temporary shortfall in cash flow. Our previous discussion and the arguments of the
US authorities in the Aetna/Prudential case show, however, that one does not have
to appeal to this whole host of frictions in order to claim that larger buyers can exert
substantially more pressure on suppliers by threatening to withhold their demand.
Buyer power originating from the characteristics of the production technology
To isolate buyer power originating from the characteristics of the supplier’s produc-
tion technology, suppose now that demand at each firm takes the following extreme
form. At each firm the quantity x˜ > 0 can be sold at any price that does not exceed
p˜ > 0, while an increase in sales by lowering prices is not feasible. Suppose further x˜
is suﬃciently small such that to maximize industry profits it is optimal to sell x˜ at all
firms whose owners have successfully negotiated with the supplier. Hence, it holds that
Π∗n = nx˜p˜− C(nx˜).
Consider again first the case where the downstream market is fully fragmented. If
negotiations with a single buyer break down, the supplier reduces his production from
x∗N = Nx˜ to x
∗
N−1 = (N − 1)x˜. The net surplus obtained by supplying to an additional
firm is then x˜p˜ − [C(Nx˜)− C((N − 1)x˜)]. An individual buyer bears the fraction ρ of
the incremental costs C(Nx˜)−C((N −1)x˜). When negotiating with a larger buyer who
controls r firms, the net surplus becomes
rx˜p˜− [C(Nx˜)− C((N − r)x˜)] ,
i.e., this time the large buyer will compensate the supplier for the fraction ρ of the in-
cremental costs created by increasing supply from (N − r)x˜ to Nx˜. We thus find that
the larger buyer can obtain more profits than two small buyers if the resulting incre-
mental costs increase under-proportionally with the buyer’s size. As is easily checked
this holds if the cost function exhibits increasing unit costs. This holds, in particular, if
C is strictly convex.
Generalization
23Kesko/Tuko (EC/DGIV, 1999, Case No. IV/M.784) and Carrefour/Promodes (EC/DGIV, 2000,
Case No. COMP/M.1684).
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Using the previous arguments we can now ask more generally when industry profits
are strictly concave in the number of firms such that (11) holds. We find that this is the
case if revenues are strictly concave and costs are strictly convex.
Proposition 2. If the cost function is strictly convex and the revenue function strictly
concave, condition (11) holds, i.e., Π∗n is strictly concave in n. This also holds if costs
are linear, but total capacity is suﬃciently small and the revenue function is strictly
concave.
Proof. Take first the case where capacity is unconstrained. It is now convenient
to denote x˜n = x∗n/n. By noting that revenues and costs are twice continuously diﬀer-
entiable, x˜n is given by the first-order condition R0(x˜n) − C 0(nx˜n) = 0. Applying the
implicit function theorem, we then obtain
dx˜n
dn
=
x˜nC
00(nx˜n)
R00(x˜n)− nC 00(nx˜n)
. (13)
We next diﬀerentiate industry profits Π∗n = nx˜np(x˜n)−C(nx˜n) with respect to n. Using
the envelope theorem, we obtain dΠ∗n/dn = x˜n[p(x˜n)−C 0(nx˜n)]. Diﬀerentiating a second
time and using the first-order condition for x˜n, we obtain
d2Π∗n
dn2
= −C 00(nx˜n)x˜n
"
x˜n + n
dx˜n
dn
#
. (14)
Substituting (13) into (14) this yields
d2Π∗n
dn2
= −C
00(nx˜n) (x˜n)
2R00(x˜n)
R00(x˜n)− nC 00(nx˜n)
,
which is strictly negative if revenues are strictly concave and costs are strictly convex.
For the second assertion note first that if capacity is suﬃciently constrained, the opti-
mal choice satisfies x∗n = X for all n. Industry profits are then given by Π∗n = nR(X/n)−
C(X). Diﬀerentiating twice yields in this case dΠ∗n/dn = R(X/n) −XR0(X/n)/n and
d2Π∗n/dn = X2R00(X/n)/n3. Q.E.D.
Having derived conditions when the creation of a larger buyer by a merger or by
a sale of assets reduces the supplier’s profits, it would be interesting to know more
precisely when this reduction is larger or smaller. When is the discount enjoyed by a
larger buyer more likely to be high or low? Denote a buyer’s margin per supplied unit
by mi, i.e., mi = p(x∗N/N)− τ i. Denote also the first-order diﬀerence of industry profits
by ∆∗n = Π∗n − Π∗n−1 for all 1 ≤ n ≤ N . Hence, we obtain for the net surplus creation
of a buyer with r firms Π∗N − Π∗N−r =
PN
N−r+1∆∗n. From (9) the ratio of two buyers’
margins is then given by
mi
mj
=
PN
N−ri+1∆
∗
nPN
N−rj+1∆∗n
rj
ri
. (15)
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When is the ratiomi/mj likely to increase? Unfortunately, as the diﬀerences in industry
profits ∆∗n depend on the respective optimal supplies, there is little that can be said
generally. In particular, we know from examples that increasing the curvature of the
cost function will not necessarily result in an increase of mi/mj for ri > rj. However,
abstracting from this diﬃculty and focusing on the case with fixed capacity X, we can
shed more light on the demand-side source of buyer power.
Example 1: Constant-elasticity demand with fixed capacity
Suppose that demand at each firm is given by the constant elasticity (inverse) demand
function p(x) = x−1/² with ² > 1. If X is suﬃciently small and production costs are zero,
this yields the industry profits Π∗n = n(X/n)(²−1)/². Focusing on the case with ri = 2
and rj = 1, we obtain from (15)
mi
mj
=
1
2

1 +
(N − 1) 1² − (N − 2) 1²
N
1
² − (N − 1) 1²

 ,
which can be seen to be strictly increasing in the elasticity ². Hence, as demand becomes
more elastic the ratio of the large buyer’s to the small buyer’s margin mi/mj increases.
Demand may become more elastic as competition at each individual outlet increases,
e.g., due to the presence of more competitors or, in the case of retailing, due to the rise
of other retail formats (e.g., e-commerce). If demand is less elastic, revenues lost due to
a loss of a particular buyer do not increase that much with the buyer’s size. Indeed, for
ε → 1 we obtain that Π∗n becomes linear in n, implying that in the limit larger buyers
do no longer obtain a discount at all.
6 Supplier Incentives and Welfare
6.1 Incentives
The supplier can now take actions aﬀecting either production costs or final demand. On
the production side, he may consider to upgrade his production process, to extend his
capacity, or to switch between diﬀerent production and distribution technologies. On
the demand side, the supplier may consider to introduce a new product or to improve
the existing product’s quality. The following analysis applies to the extent that these
activities are not contractible. One application where this assumption seems to be
particularly reasonable is again retailing, as retailers usually stock the products of many
diﬀerent suppliers. Writing detailed contracts regarding the improvement of products
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and production processes with all suppliers is surely not feasible for any given retailer.24
The main point which we want to make in this section is that the supplier’s choice
of non-contractible activities depends not on the overall size of his profits, but on the
“composition” of his profits. In Section 6.2 we will use the generated insights to argue
that the welfare consequences of buyer power may therefore be diﬀerent from what is
often asserted.
Recall that each buyer obtains the fraction ρ of his net contribution to total industry
profits. When selecting, for instance, a particular production technology, the supplier
thus tries to increase total industry profits while keeping buyers’ net contributions mini-
mal. These two objectives should typically be conflicting. How this trade-oﬀ is resolved
depends on the downstream market structure. We now treat strategies aﬀecting the cost
(or production) side and strategies aﬀecting the revenue (or demand) side separately.
Process innovation
How does the formation of a larger buyer aﬀect the way in which costs are shared
between the supplier and his buyers? To answer this question we can use the insights
gained when discussing the sources of buyer power. A buyer controlling r firms must
bear the fraction ρ of the additionally generated costs C(x∗N)− C(x∗N−r). Hence, if two
firms merge the supplier loses twice the fraction ρ of the incremental costs C(x∗N) −
C(x∗N−1), but he gains the fraction ρ of the incremental costs C(x
∗
N) − C(x∗N−2). In
other words, after the merger the supplier can “roll over” more of the costs generated by
increasing production at relatively low quantities, i.e., from x∗N−2 to x
∗
N−1, and less of the
costs generated by increasing production at relatively high quantities, i.e., from x∗N−1 to
x∗N . Following a merger he will thus have higher incentives to reduce incremental costs
incurred at high production volumes and lower incentives to reduce incremental costs
incurred at low production volumes.
This logic extends to mergers where buyers control more than one firm. Moreover,
inspecting (10) reveals that it also extends to the case where a smaller buyer sells firms
to a larger buyer. We can thus make the following observation.25
Observation 1. After the creation of a larger buyer, e.g., through a merger or a
sale of assets by a smaller buyer, the supplier focuses more on reducing incremental costs
incurred at high production volumes and less on reducing incremental costs incurred at
low production volumes.
We next illustrate Observation 1 with an example.
24Additionally, the presence of multiple retailers may generate public-good problems, e.g., on how to
split the investment outlays.
25Observation 1 is related to Stole and Zwiebel (1996) who find that it matters for a firm’s choice of
technology whether workers are unionized or whether they negotiate independently.
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Example 2: Process innovation
Suppose there are N = 3 buyers. Each buyer controls a single firm with a final
demand given by p(x) = 1−x. We specify the sharing rule ρ = 1/2. Before negotiations
start the supplier can choose between two production technologies A and B, which are
associated with the cost functions CA(x) = 12cAx
2 and CB(x) = cBx, where we specify
cA = 1 and require 0 < cB < 1. A simple interpretation is that the more innovative
technology B can be more flexibly adjusted to higher production quantities.
Under the linear technology B we obtain Π∗n = n (1− cB)
2 /4, while under the
quadratic technology A we obtain Π∗n = n/[2(2 + n)]. With linear costs the supplier’s
profits, which are not aﬀected by the downstream market structure, are by Proposition
1 equal to V B = 3 (1− cB)2 /8. In the quadratic case denote the respective profits with
I independent buyers by V AI , where we obtain V
A
3 = 9/40 and V
A
2 = 5/24. It is easily
seen that V A2 < V
A
3 holds, which confirms Corollary 1.
Comparing next V B with V A3 and V
A
2 , we can see that the supplier has more incentives
to implement technologyB if he faces only two independent buyers. One way to formalize
this is to assume that switching to the more flexible technology B requires some up-
front investment. If he faces I independent buyers, the supplier is only prepared to
switch technologies if these costs do not surpass the threshold V B − V AI . This cost
threshold is strictly higher if the supplier faces I = 2 instead of I = 3 buyers. The
example, therefore, confirms Observation 1. The emergence of a large retailer increases
the supplier’s incentives to adopt technology B, which -compared with technology A-
exhibits lower incremental costs at relatively high output levels and larger incremental
costs at relatively low output levels.
Product innovation
Let us now consider non-contractible investment strategies that aﬀect the revenue (or
demand) side of the industry. We can now rely on the insights obtained when discussing
how buyer power may originate from characteristics of final demand. If the downstream
market is fully fragmented, the supplier’s outside option in negotiations depends only
on how well he can cope with the loss of a single market (firm). In contrast, if two firms
merge, the supplier faces also the threat of losing two markets simultaneously. Hence,
after the merger of two firms the supplier’s profits depend more on how revenues change
when increasing supply at each remaining firm from x∗N−1/(N − 1) to x∗N−2/(N − 2)
and less on how revenues change when increasing supply from x∗N/N to x
∗
N−1/(N −
1).26 The merger thus makes the supplier focus more on incremental revenues generated
at relatively higher supply levels. As this logic extends again to any merger and, by
26Note that x∗n/n is strictly decreasing for convex costs (see Proposition 2).
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inspection of (10), also to the sale of assets from a smaller to a larger buyer, we can
make the following observation.
Observation 2. After the creation of a larger buyer, e.g., through a merger or a
sale of assets by a smaller buyer, the supplier focuses more on increasing incremental
revenues at high quantities and less on increasing incremental revenues at low quantities.
We provide again an illustration.
Example 3: Product innovation
Suppose the supplier has fixed capacity X and incurs no production costs. We
specify again that there are N = 3 buyers each controlling a single firm, and that the
sharing rule ρ = 1/2 applies. The supplier can influence the “versatility” of his input.
To capture this, suppose that at each market two goods can be supplied, which both
require per unit of output one unit of the same input. The extent to which these goods
can be diﬀerentiated depends on the versatility of the input. Precisely, suppose that
each firm faces for good xj, where j = 1, 2, the inverse demand pj = 1− xj − γxk, with
k 6= j and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.27 The supplier can choose between two variants A and B with
respective versatilities γA and γB. Product diﬀerentiation is larger with variant B, i.e.,
0 ≤ γB < γA ≤ 1.
If capacity is suﬃciently small such that it is binding even if only a single market
is supplied, we obtain for all n the industry profits Π∗n = X[1 − X(1 + γ)/(2n)]. If
the downstream market is fragmented with I = 3 independent buyers, we obtain from
Proposition 1 that the supplier’s profits equal X[1− 7X(1 + γ)/24]. If two firms merge
the supplier’s profits equal X[1−3X(1+γ)/8]. As previously we denote profits realized
under the respective variants by V AI and V
B
I , where I = 2, 3. The supplier’s gain
from implementing the more versatile input variant B instead of variant A equals now
V B3 −V A3 = 7X2(γA−γB)/24 if the downstream industry is fragmented and V B2 −V A2 =
3X2(γA− γB)/8 if two buyers have merged. Comparison of both threshold values yields
that the supplier is prepared to invest more to produce the more versatile variant B if
the downstream industry becomes more concentrated. Intuitively, by choosing the more
versatile variant B the supplier can more easily divert large supply quantities away
from one buyer to others without significant reductions in retail prices. This ability is
important to sustain the value of the supplier’s outside option when negotiating with a
large buyer.
27While this set-up is not fully captured by our model, where we assumed that one unit of input is
transferred into one unit of an homogeneous output, it can be easily brought in line as follows. Given
the specified demand function, a firm will optimally allocate supply symmetrically over the two final
products. This generates for given x at each firm the revenue function R(x) = 2(1− (1− γ)x/2).
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6.2 Welfare Eﬀects of Buyer Power
In this section we address the often expressed view that the exercise of buyer power
is detrimental to social welfare as it reduces suppliers’ investments into product and
process innovation. As already noted in the introduction this argument was repeatedly
expressed in recent policy debates. The underlying presumption is that a reduction in
the supplier’s profits will also reduce his incentives to make investments. According to
our view, this argument has two flaws.
Our first criticism stems from the previous observation that a supplier’s incentives to
engage in product and process innovation are more driven by the composition of the
supplier’s profits and less by its absolute level.28 As argued in the preceding section,
the emergence of larger buyers makes the supplier focus more on reducing incremental
production costs at high production volumes and on increasing incremental revenues at
high supplied quantities. This shift may increase the supplier’s incentives to perform
certain activities of product and process innovation. By means of our previous example
we will further demonstrate for the case of process innovation that the formation of
larger buyers may thus increase welfare. This follows as the supplier’s resulting choice of
technology is likely to increase overall supply, which is beneficial as by ignoring consumer
rents firms will typically choose too low quantities for any given technology.
The second flaw in the above argument is more immediate and concerns, in par-
ticular, product improvement. The argument implicitly asserts that higher investment
incentives are always beneficial. Since Spence (1975, 1976) it is, however, well known
that firms’ incentives to improve a product’s quality or to introduce diﬀerentiated vari-
ants may sometimes be too high (see Tirole 1988 for an overview). While it is the
marginal consumer’s valuation that determines a firm’s optimal quality choice, from a
welfare perspective it should be the average valuation of served consumers. This will be
illustrated in our example of product innovation where the formation of a larger buyer
can induce the supplier to undertake a higher investment that is not socially beneficial.
Example 2 (continued): Process innovation
Consider our previous example of process innovation. Recall that the choice of the
more flexible technology B may require an up-front investment by the supplier. If he
faces I independent buyers, he is only prepared to switch if these costs do not exceed the
threshold kI = V B − V AI . Recall that k2 > k3 holds, i.e., the supplier is more prepared
to switch after two of the three firms have merged. In particular, we obtain k2 =
3 (1− cB)2 /8−5/24, where cB denotes the constant marginal costs under technology B.
Clearly, technology B will only be chosen as long as cB is not too large. In the following
28Admittedly, total profits play a more important role when considering, for instance, potential entry.
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we restrict attention to this case by requiring that cB does not exceed the threshold
c¯B = 1− 13
√
5.
Turn now to the consideration of total welfare, i.e., the sum of consumer rents and
industry profits, which we denote by W .29 We obtain that, given the chosen supplies
x∗N , welfare equals W
A = 9/25 under technology A and WB = 9(1 − cB)2/8 under
technology B. This yields the threshold k∗ = WB − WA such that from a welfare
perspective technology B should be chosen if the additional up-front costs do not exceed
k∗. Comparing thresholds we finally find that k∗ > k2 holds if 6(1 − cB)2/8 > 91/600
is satisfied. This holds for all values cB ≤ c¯B. Hence, from a welfare perspective the
supplier should switch technologies more often than he does even in the case where he
faces a larger buyer. Moreover, if the costs of switching to the more flexible technology
fall into the interval (k2, k3), the buyer merger strictly increases welfare by inducing the
supplier to undertake the investment.
This example, therefore, supports our first criticism. Buyer power may unfold socially
beneficial eﬀects by shifting suppliers’ incentives for cost reductions to high levels of
production. As marginal cost reductions transform into an expansion of total output
and thereby an increase in consumer surplus, buyer power may also increase social
welfare.30
Example 3 (continued): Product innovation
We denote by kI the maximum up-front costs the supplier is willing to pay in order to
switch from variant A to the more versatile variant B, if there are I independent buyers.
We obtained k2 = 3X2(γA − γB)/8 and k3 = 7X2(γA − γB)/24, where k2 > k3 follows
from γA > γB. The realized welfare is W = X[1 −X(1 + γ)/(4n)] if the versatility is
given by γ and if n firms are supplied.31 From a welfare perspective there should be
a switch to the more versatile input B as long as the additional costs do not exceed
k∗∗ = X2(γA − γB)/12. This threshold falls short of both k2 and k3. Hence, in this
example the supplier’s incentives to choose a more versatile input are always too high
from a welfare perspective. If the costs of choosing the more versatile input fall into
the interval (k3, k2), welfare is reduced by a buyer merger as this induces the supplier to
undertake the investment even though this is not socially beneficial.
This example, therefore, supports our second criticism. With product innovation the
formation of larger buyers may reduce welfare, but this may be due to an increase in
29We hereby assume that the inverse demand function is generated by quadratic utility function of a
representative consumer, which is given by x− 12x
2.
30For cB ≤ c¯B it is immediate that equilibrium supply is strictly larger under technology B than
under technology A.
31We hereby assume that the inverse demand function is generated by a quadratic utility function of
a representative consumer of the form (x1 + x2)− 12(x21 + x22)− γx1x2.
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investment incentives and not due to a reduction.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of buyer power on a supplier’s profits and his incentives
to undertake non-contractible activities. We first isolate two sources of buyer power. If
revenues at each downstream firm are strictly concave, larger buyers can threaten the
supplier with a loss in revenues that grows over-proportionally with size. If produc-
tion costs are convex, additional costs incurred by serving an individual buyer increase
under-proportionally with his size. While facing a larger buyer decreases the supplier’s
profits, we argue that his incentives to undertake product or process innovation may of-
ten increase. Facing a larger buyer the supplier will focus more on reducing incremental
costs incurred at high volumes and he will focus more on increasing incremental revenues
generated at high supply levels. As a reduction in marginal costs at high output levels
may increase total supply and thus consumer rents, a supplier facing larger buyers may
more often than not choose a production technology that increases welfare. In contrast,
in the case of product innovation we showed that it is quite likely that the formation
of larger buyers reduces welfare by creating too high investment incentives and not by
reducing incentives.
Taking the broader picture of horizontal merger control, our findings qualify the
commonly held belief that the leverage of large buyers in contract negotiations nega-
tively aﬀects suppliers’ investment incentives and, by doing so, welfare. As we found
that the opposite may happen, our analysis also calls for a more systematic assessment
of dynamic eﬃciency concerns in merger control. While the “innovation markets” con-
cept (see Gilbert and Sunshine 1995) is an important step in that direction, our paper
demonstrates that not only horizontal concentration between innovating firms but also
concentration along the entire value chain may matter.
References
Balto, D.A. (1999), Supermarket Merger Enforcement, Antitrust Report, August 1999.
Bernheim, B.D. and Whinston, M.D. (1986), Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and
Economic Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 101, 1-31.
Binmore, K., Rubinstein, A., and Wolinsky, A. (1986), The Nash Bargaining Solution
in Economic Modelling, Rand Journal of Economics 17, 176-188.
21
Blair, R.D. and J.L. Harrison (1993), Monopsony: Antitrust Law and Economics,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Bolton, P. and Whinston, M.A. (1993), Incomplete Contracts, Vertical Integration and
Supply Assurance, Review of Economic Studies 60, 121-148.
Bowley, A.L. (1928), Bilateral Monopoly, Economic Journal 38, 651-659.
Chipty, T. and Snyder, C.M. (1999), The Role of Firm Size in Bilateral Bargaining:
A Study of the Cable Television Industry, Review of Economics and Statistics 81,
326-340.
Choi, J.P. and Yi, S.-S. (2000), Vertical Foreclosure with the Choice of Input Specifi-
cations, Rand Journal of Economics 31, 717-743.
Cotterill, R.M. (1997), The Food Distribution System of the Future: Convergence
Towards the US or UK Model?, Agrobusiness 12, 123-135.
Dobson, P. and Waterson, M. (1997), Countervailing Power and Consumer Prices,
Economic Journal 107, 418-430.
Ellison, S.F. and Snyder, C.M. (2001), Countervailing Power in Wholesale Pharmaceu-
ticals, Working Paper 01-27, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge,
MA.
EC (1999), Buyer Power and its Impact on Competition in the Food Retail Distribution
Sector of the European Union, Report produced for the European Commission,
DG IV, Brussels.
Felli, L. and Roberts, K. (2001), Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?,
STICERDTheoretical Economics Discussion Paper No. TE/01/414, London School
of Economics, London.
FTC (2000), Entering the 21st Century: Competition Policy in the World of B2B Elec-
tronic Marketplaces, Report by the Federal Trade Commission Staﬀ, Washington,
D.C.
FTC (2001), Report on the Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Slotting Al-
lowances and Other Marketing Practices in the Grocery Industry, Report by the
Federal Trade Commission Staﬀ, Washington, D.C.
Galbraith, J.K. (1952), American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power,
Boston: Houghton Miﬄin.
22
Gaynor, M. and Haas-Wilson, D. (1999), Change, Consolidation, and Competition in
Health Care, Journal of Economic Perspectives 13, 141-164.
Gilbert, R. and Sunshine, S.C. (1995), Incorporating Dynamic Eﬃciency Concerns
in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovative Markets, Antitrust Law Journal 63,
569-601.
Grossman, S.J. and Hart, O.D. (1986), The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory
of Vertical and Lateral Integration, Journal of Political Economy 94, 691-719.
Grout, P. (1984), Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts, Econo-
metrica 52, 449-460.
Hendricks, K. and McAfee, R.P. (2000), A Theory of Bilateral Oligopoly with Appli-
cations to Vertical Mergers, Mimeo, University of Texas, Austin.
Horn, H. and Wolinsky, A. (1988a), Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger,
Rand Journal of Economics 19, 408-419.
Horn, H. and Wolinsky, A. (1988b), Worker Substitutability and Patterns of Unionisa-
tion, Economic Journal 98, 484-497.
Inderst, R. and Wey, C. (2001), Market Structure, Bargaining, and Technology Choice
in Bilaterally Oligopolistic Industries, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2981, London.
Innes, R. and Sexton, R.J. (1993), Customer Coalitions, Monopoly Price Discrimination
and Generic Entry Deterrence, European Economic Review 37, 1569-1597.
Katz, M.L. (1987), The Welfare Eﬀects of Third Degree Price Discrimination in Inter-
mediate Goods Markets, American Economic Review 77, 154-167.
Kühn, K.-U. (1997), Nonlinear Pricing in Vertically Related Duopolies, Rand Journal
of Economics 28, 37-62.
Kolasky, W.J. (2002), Coordinated Eﬀects in Merger Review: From Dead Frenchmen
to Beautiful Minds and Mavericks, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington.
Kranton, R.E. and Minehart, D.F. (2000), Networks vs. Vertical Integration, Rand
Journal of Economics 31, 570-601.
Marx, L.M. and Shaﬀer, G. (2001), Upfront Payments and Exclusion, Mimeo, Univer-
sity of Rochester.
23
McLaren, J. (2000), Globalization and Vertical Structure, American Economic Review
90, 1239-54.
Morgan, J.M. (1949), Bilateral Monopoly and the Competitive Output, Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics 63, 371-91.
O’Brien, D.P. and Shaﬀer, G. (1997), Nonlinear Supply Contracts, Exclusive Deal-
ing, and Equilibrium Market Foreclosure, Journal of Economics and Management
Strategy 6, 755-785.
OECD (1981), Buying Power: The Exercise of Market Power by Dominant Buyers,
Report of the Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices, OECD,
Paris.
OECD (1999), Buying Power of Multiproduct Retailers, Series Roundtables on Com-
petition Policy DAFFE/CLP(99)21, OECD, Paris.
OFT (1998), The Welfare Consequences of the Exercise of Buyer Power, Oﬃce of Fair
Trading Research Paper No. 16, London.
Pitofsky, R. (1997), Thoughts on “Leveling the Playing Field” in Health Care Markets,
Federal Trade Commission (February 13, 1997), Washington D.C.
Porter, M.E. (1976), Interbrand Choice, Strategy, and Bilateral Market Power, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Robinson, T. and Clarke-Hill, C.M. (1995), International Alliances in European Re-
tailing, in: P.J. McGoldrick and G. Davies (eds.), International Retailing: Trends
and Strategies, Financial Times Pitman Publishing.
Scheﬀman, D.T. and Spiller, P.T. (1992), Buyer’s Strategies, Entry Barriers, and Com-
petition, Economic Inquiry 30, 418-436.
Scherer, F.M. and Ross, D. (1990), Industrial Market Structure and Economic Perfor-
mance, 3rd Edition, Houghton Miﬄin Comp., Boston, MA.
Schwartz, M. (1999), Buyer Power Concerns and the Aetna-Prudential Merger, U.S.
Department of Justice (October 20, 1999), Washington D.C.
Segal, I. (2001), Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining,
Mimeo, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.
Snyder, C.M. (1996), A Dynamic Theory of Countervailing Power, Rand Journal of
Economics 27, 747-769.
24
Sorensen, A.T. (2001), Insurer-Hospital Bargaining: Negotiated Discounts in Post-
Deregulation Conneticut, Mimeo, University of California, San Diego.
Spence, M. (1975), Monopoly, Quality and Regulation, Bell Journal of Economics 6,
417-29.
Spence, M. (1976), Product Diﬀerentiation and Welfare, American Economic Review
66, 407-14.
Spulber, D.F. (2002), Market Microstructure and Incentives to Invest, Journal of Po-
litical Economy 110, 352-381.
Stigler, G.J. (1954), The Economist Plays with Blocs, American Economic Review 44,
7-14.
Stigler, G.J. (1964), A Theory of Oligopoly, Journal of Political Economy 62, 44-66.
Stole, L.A. and Zwiebel, J. (1996), Organizational Design and Technology Choice under
Intrafirm Bargaining, American Economic Review 86, 195-222.
Sullivan, M.W. (1999), Slotting Allowances and the Market for New Products, Journal
of Law and Economics 40, 461-493.
Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
von Ungern-Sternberg, T. (1996), Countervailing Power Revisited, International Jour-
nal of Industrial Organization 14, 507-520.
Waterson, M. (1980), Price-cost Margins and Successive Market Power, Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics 94, 135-150.
25
Bücher des Forschungsschwerpunkts Markt und politische Ökonomie  
Books of the Research Area Markets and Political Economy  
 
Andreas Stephan 
Essays on the Contribution of Public Infrastruc-
ture to Private:  Production and its Political 
Economy 
2002, dissertation.de 
Hans Mewis 
Essays on Herd Behavior and Strategic 
Delegation 
2001, Shaker Verlag 
Andreas Moerke 
Organisationslernen über Netzwerke – Die 
personellen Verflechtungen von 
Führungsgremien japanischer 
Aktiengesellschaften 
2001, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Silke Neubauer 
Multimarket Contact and Organizational Design 
2001, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Christian Wey (Eds.) 
Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft in der neuen 
Weltwirtschaft, WZB Jahrbuch 2001 
2001, edition sigma 
Michael Tröge 
Competition in Credit Markets: A Theoretic 
Analysis 
2001, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Tobias Miarka 
Financial Intermediation and Deregulation:  
A Critical Analysis of Japanese Bank-Firm-
Relationships 
2000, Physica-Verlag 
Rita Zobel 
Beschäftigungsveränderungen und 
organisationales Lernen in japanischen 
Industriengesellschaften 
2000, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
http://dochost.rz.hu-berlin.de/dissertationen/zobel-
rita-2000-06-19  
Jos Jansen 
Essays on Incentives in Regulation and 
Innovation 
2000, Tilburg University 
Ralph Siebert 
Innovation, Research Joint Ventures, and 
Multiproduct Competition 
2000, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
http://dochost.rz.hu-berlin.de/dissertationen/siebert-
ralph-2000-03-23/  
Damien J. Neven, Lars-Hendrik Röller (Eds.) 
The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in 
Europe and the Member States 
2000, edition sigma 
Jianping Yang 
Bankbeziehungen deutscher Unternehmen: 
Investitionsverhalten und Risikoanalyse 
2000, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Christoph Schenk 
Cooperation between Competitors – 
Subcontracting and the Influence of Information, 
Production and Capacity on Market Structure and 
Competition 
1999, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
http://dochost.rz.hu-berlin.de/dissertationen/schenk-
christoph-1999-11-16  
Horst Albach, Ulrike Görtzen, Rita Zobel (Eds.) 
Information Processing as a Competitive 
Advantage of Japanese Firms 
1999, edition sigma 
Dieter Köster 
Wettbewerb in Netzproduktmärkten 
1999, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Christian Wey 
Marktorganisation durch Standardisierung: Ein 
Beitrag zur Neuen Institutionenökonomik des 
Marktes 
1999, edition sigma 
Horst Albach, Meinolf Dierkes, Ariane Berthoin Antal, 
Kristina Vaillant (Hg.) 
Organisationslernen – institutionelle und 
kulturelle Dimensionen 
WZB-Jahrbuch 1998 
1998, edition sigma 
Lars Bergman, Chris Doyle, Jordi Gual, Lars 
Hultkrantz, Damien Neven, Lars-Hendrik Röller, 
Leonard Waverman 
Europe’s Network Industries: Conflicting 
Priorities - Telecommunications 
Monitoring European Deregulation 1 
1998, Centre for Economic Policy Research 
Manfred Fleischer  
The Inefficiency Trap 
Strategy Failure in the  
German Machine Tool Industry 
1997, edition sigma 
Christian Göseke 
Information Gathering and Dissemination 
The Contribution of JETRO to  
Japanese Competitiveness 
1997, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
 
DISCUSSION PAPERS 2002 
 
 
Fredrik Andersson 
Kai A. Konrad 
Human Capital Investment and Globalization in 
Extortionary States 
FS IV 02 – 01 
Lars-Hendrik Röller 
Christian Wey 
Merger Control in the New Economy FS IV 02 – 02 
Talat Mahmood 
Klaus Schömann 
Die Determinanten der Mirgrationsentscheidung 
von IT-Hochschulabsolventen aus Pakistan –
Empirische Befunde zur Ausgestaltung der 
deutschen „Green Card“ 
FS IV 02 – 03 
Talat Mahmood 
Klaus Schömann 
The Determinants of the Migration Decision of IT-
graduates from Pakistan: Empirical Evidence for 
the Design of a German "Green Card" 
FS IV 02 – 03a 
Jos Jansen The Effects of Disclosure Regulation on Innovative 
Firms:  Common Values 
FS IV 02 – 04 
Jos Jansen The Effects of Disclosure Regulation on Innovative 
Firms:  Private Values 
FS IV 02 – 05 
Günter Franke 
Harris Schlesinger 
Richard C. Stapleton 
Multiplicative Background Risk FS IV 02 – 06  
Tomaso Duso On the Politics of the Regulatory Reform:  
Econometric Evidence from the OECD Countries 
FS IV 02 – 07 
Johan Lagerlöf 
Paul Heidhues 
On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in 
Merger Control 
FS IV 02 – 08 
Olivier Cadot 
Lars-Hendrik Röller 
Andreas Stephan 
Contribution to Productivity or Pork Barrel?  The 
Two Faces of Infrastructure Investment 
FS IV 02 – 09 
Justus Haucap 
Christian Wey 
Unionization Structures and Firms’ Incentives for 
Productivity Enhancing Investments 
FS IV 02 – 10  
Heidrun C. Hoppe 
Emre Ozdenoren 
Intermediation in Innovation FS IV 02 – 11 
Rainer Nitsche On the Effectiveness of Anti-Predation Rules FS IV 02 – 12 
Daniel Krähmer Entry and Experimentation in  
Oligopolistic Markets for Experience Goods 
FS IV 02 – 13 
J. Peter Murmann The Coevolution of Industries and National 
Institutions: Theory and Evidence 
FS IV 02 – 14 
Kai A. Konrad Terrorism and the State FS IV 02 – 15 
Robert Nuscheler Physician Reimbursement, Time-Consistency and 
the Quality of Care 
FS IV 02 – 16 
Fredrik Andersson 
Kai A. Konrad 
Taxation and Education Investment in the Tertiary 
Sector 
FS IV 02 – 17 
Jan Boone ‘Be nice, unless it pays to fight’: A New Theory of 
Price Determination with Implications for 
Competition Policy 
FS IV 02 – 18 
Kai A. Konrad Altruism and Envy in Contests: 
An Evolutionarily Stable Symbiosis 
FS IV 02 – 19 
Helmut Bester 
Kai A. Konrad 
Delay in Contests FS IV 02 – 20 
Kjell Erik Lommerud 
Bjørn Sandvik 
Odd Rune Straume 
Good Jobs, Bad Jobs and Redistribution FS IV 02 – 21 
Steffen Huck 
Vicki Knoblauch 
Wieland Müller 
On the Profitability of Collusion in Location Games FS IV 02 – 22 
Ralph Siebert Learning by Doing and Multiproduction Effects 
over the Life Cycle: Evidence from the 
Semiconductor Industry 
FS IV 02 – 23 
Jürgen Bracht 
Saul Lach 
Eyal Winter 
Modeling Oligopolistic Price Adjustment in Micro 
Level Panel Data 
FS IV 02 – 24 
Steffen Huck 
Kai A. Konrad 
Strategic Trade Policy and the Home Bias in Firm 
Ownership Structure 
FS IV 02 – 25 
Daniel Krähmer Delegation versus Authority FS IV 02 – 26 
Thomas Knaus 
Robert Nuscheler 
Incomplete Risk Adjustment and Adverse 
Selection in the German Public Health Insurance 
System 
FS IV 02 – 27 
Kurt R. Brekke 
Robert Nuscheler 
Odd Rune Straume 
Quality and Location Choices under Price 
Regulation 
FS IV 02 – 28 
Kai A. Konrad Inverse Campaigning FS IV 02 – 29 
Sebastian Kessing A Note on the Determinants of Labour Share 
Movements 
FS IV 02 – 30 
Sebastian Kessing Employment Protection and Product Market 
Competition 
FS IV 02 – 31 
Michal Grajek Identification of Network Externalities in Markets 
for Non-Durables 
FS IV 02 – 32 
Robert M. Adams 
Lars-Hendrik Röller 
Robin C. Sickles 
Market Power in Outputs and Inputs:  An Empirical 
Application to Banking 
FS IV 02 – 33 
Tomaso Duso 
Damien J. Neven 
Lars-Hendrik Röller 
The Political Economy of European Merger 
Control:  Evidence using Stock Market Data 
FS IV 02 – 34 
Tomaso Duso 
Astrid Jung 
Market Conduct and Endogenous Lobbying:  Evi-
dence from the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications 
Industry 
FS IV 02 – 35 
DISCUSSION PAPERS 2003 
 
 
Anette Boom Investments in Electricity Generating Capacity 
under Different Market Structures and with 
Endogenously Fixed Demand 
SP II 2003 – 01 
Kai A. Konrad 
Wolfram F. Richter 
Zur Berücksichtigung von Kindern 
bei umlagefinanzierter Alterssicherung 
SP II 2003 – 02 
Stergios Skaperdas Restraining the Genuine Homo Economicus: Why 
the Economy cannot be divorced from its 
Governance 
SP II 2003 – 03 
Johan Lagerlöf Insisting on a Non-Negative Price:  Oligopoly, 
Uncertainty, Welfare, and Multiple Equilibria 
SP II 2003 – 04 
Roman Inderst 
Christian Wey 
Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives SP II 2003 – 05 
 
Bei Ihren Bestellungen von WZB-Papers schicken 
Sie bitte unbedingt einen an Sie adressierten Auf-
kleber mit sowie je paper eine Briefmarke im Wert 
von 0,51 Euro oder einen "Coupon Reponse Inter-
national " (für Besteller aus dem Ausland) 
 Please send a self addressed label and postage 
stamps in the amount of 0.51 Euro or a "Coupon- 
Reponse International" (if you are ordering from 
outside Germany) for each WZB-paper requested 
 
Bestellschein Order Form 
 
 
 
 
Absender / Return Address: 
 
 
 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin 
für Sozialforschung 
Presse- und informationsreferat 
Reichpietschufer 50 
 
D-10785 Berlin-Tiergarten  
 
 
 
Hiermit bestelle ich folgende(s) 
Discussion paper(s): 
 
 
 
Please send me the following 
Discussion paper(s): 
Bestell-Nr. / Order no. Autor/in, Kurztitel /Author(s) / Title(s) in brief 
  
 
